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Abstract: Foreign flows have an economically large and statistically significant impact on long-
term interest rates.  Controlling for various macroeconomic factors we estimate that had there 
been no foreign flows into U.S. bonds over the past year, the 10-year Treasury yield would 
currently be 150 basis points higher; even a step-down to average inflows would imply an 
increase of 105 basis points.  The impact of the headline-making foreign official flows—a 
relatively small subset of total foreign accumulation of U.S. bonds—is also significant but 
markedly smaller.  Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. 
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  There is a burgeoning literature on the impact of international capital flows on 
emerging market economies.  For example, we have learned in recent years that in 
emerging markets foreign flows can result in a reduction in systematic risk (Chari and 
Henry (2004)) and an increase in both physical investment (Henry (2000, 2003)) and 
economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005)).  These positive aspects of 
capital flows are tempered by the role of foreign flows in spreading crises (Boyer, 
Kumagai, and Yuan (2005)). 
  In comparison, we know very little about the role of foreign flows in large 
developed economies.  We aim to fill this gap by examining the impact of international 
capital flows on what is arguably the most important price in the U.S. economy—and 
possibly the world—that of the ten-year Treasury bond.  Specifically, we ask to what 
extent foreign flows into U.S. bond markets can explain movements in long-term 
Treasury yields.   
  We address this issue at an important time.  Two years ago, in the summer of 
2003, short-term interest rates were very low and inflation was under control.  Most 
models would have predicted very poor returns for U.S. bonds over the subsequent year 
or two.
1  And, over the course of 2004, as inflation picked up, the Federal Reserve began 
a tightening cycle that raised short rates, and economic growth strengthened, many 
market observers predicted an increase in long-term U.S. interest rates that would result 
in substantial losses on bond positions (see, for example, Roach (2005)).  Long-term 
interest rates have, however, remained quite low, and the bond market has held up at a 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003).  Other important work on the predictability of 
bond returns includes Ferson and Harvey (1991, 1993), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French 
(1989), and Campbell and Shiller (1991).   2 
 
time when many predicted subpar performance.  The stubbornly low long rates have 
puzzled not only market participants and financial economists, but also policymakers.  
Might foreign flows help explain this puzzling behavior? 
  We address this question using data on the flows of two sets of foreign investors.  
Our first measure utilizes information on the purchases of Treasury securities by so-
called foreign official institutions—prominent foreign institutions such as the Bank of 
Japan and the People’s Bank of China.  But we view a focus on foreign official flows as 
incomplete, in part because the behavior of foreign governments over the past few years 
could be characterized as stepping up purchases of U.S. bonds at times when private 
demand faltered (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber, 2004).  Our second measure of 
foreign flows combines foreign official purchases with those of private foreign investors.
2  
Private foreign investors—the main actors in nearly every study of international capital 
flows—are in aggregate much larger than the headline-grabbing foreign official 
institutions (Figure 1).  To be sure, foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds 
skyrocketed in 2003 and 2004, but these were only a small subset of foreign flows into all 
types of U.S. bonds—Treasury, corporate, and agency bonds.  At their peak in the 
summer of 2004, foreign official inflows amounted to 2.5 percent of GDP, far below the 
overall foreign purchases of U.S. bonds of 7 percent.   
  To determine the impact foreign buying of U.S. bonds has on U.S. Treasury 
yields and U.S. interest rates in general, we utilize a reduced-form model, similar in spirit 
                                                 
2 Data on private foreign investor flows is publicly available but at the same time is not readily accessible 
to researchers; one of our contributions is to show how these data can be utilized after they are corrected for 
known problems.   3 
 
to that developed in Sack (2004).
3  The methodology controls for several macroeconomic 
factors—inflation and growth expectations, the budget deficit, the federal funds rate, and 
a risk premium—that normally provide a reasonable accounting of Treasury yields.  As 
Figure 2 shows, recently these macroeconomic variables have not fared as well for long-
term interest rates, as 10-year Treasury yields are substantially lower than can be 
explained by macroeconomic conditions.  We add to the model a battery of carefully 
constructed capital flows series—the foreign official purchases that attract the most 
attention, but also all foreign purchases of Treasuries and, alternately, of all U.S. bonds.  
We find that these capital flows variables have different impacts, but each helps explain 
the surprisingly low U.S. interest rates.
4   
  Specifically, we find in our sample spanning January 1984 to May 2005 that 
foreign inflows into U.S. bonds reduce the 10-year Treasury yield by an economically 
(and statistically) significant amount.  For example, if foreigners did not accumulate U.S. 
bonds over the twelve months ending May 2005, our model suggests that the 10-year 
Treasury yield would currently be 150 basis points higher.  No foreign accumulation, or 
zero inflows over the course of a full year, might seem farfetched (although not in a 
balanced current account scenario).  But even if the United States experienced only 
average inflows of 2 percent of GDP, our point estimate suggests that U.S. rates would be 
95 basis points higher.  Other capital flows measures yield similar or even larger point 
                                                 
3  The Sack (2004) mimeo and much of the market commentary utilizes only the readily available data on 
foreign official inflows into Treasury securities, and finds modest results.  Meyer and Sack (2004), which 
also focuses on foreign official flows, updates the original mimeo and finds effects as large as 50 basis 
points. 
4 Our work can be seen as a foreign relative of a variety of papers that have focused on domestic factors.  
For example, Diebold, Piazzesi, and Rudebusch (2005) and Piazzesi (2005) examine the impact of 
domestic macroeconomic factors on the yield curve.  Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) and Green (2004), in the 
spirit of Evans (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2002), examine the impact of order flow on Treasury yields.  
See Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) for a high frequency study of the very short-run impact of foreign 
official purchases.   4 
 
estimates in our regressions, but because the flows are smaller, the overall impact is more 
muted.  For example, had foreign official flows been zero over the last twelve months, 
long rates would currently be 60 basis points higher.
5 
  Our results are robust to many alternative specifications.  In robustness checks, 
we model real long rates; foreign flows significantly affect real rates.  To eliminate the 
impact of short-run business cycle variations, we model future expected real rates (the 
real 5-year forward rate five years hence); the main results hold.  We present evidence 
that a view currently circulating in practitioner circles—that the puzzle of low rates is 
solved by incorporating a measure of corporate savings (JP Morgan, 2005)—does not 
impact our results (nor does it appear to help explain the behavior of long rates).  Our 
final robustness check involves rolling regressions.  We present the evolution of the 
coefficient estimates through time; overall inflows have significantly impacted U.S. long 
rates for over a decade. 
  Our finding that foreign flows help explain the behavior of U.S. interest rates 
leaves unanswered one potentially interesting question: Are we, on average, capturing a 
switching effect, as global investors shift allocations between U.S. and foreign bonds, or 
a supply effect in which a global savings glut leaves global investors with more funds 
available?  We are agnostic on this question—in large part because we believe that over 
time both effects are at work, perhaps with varying intensities and relative importance—
but make some attempt at addressing it in order to provide the reader with guidance that 
might will aid in the interpretation our results.  In fact, we present evidence that strongly 
suggests the former—the switching effect—is more prevalent.  In particular, if we 
                                                 
5  This is consistent with the statement in Greenspan (2005) of a “modest” impact of official flows, later to 
be defined as probably less than 50 basis points.     5 
 
include a variable that measures the spread of foreign interest rates over U.S. rates, it 
enters into our regressions with a negative and significant coefficient.  That is, when 
foreign rates rise relative to U.S. rates, U.S. rates fall, suggesting that investors are 
switching from foreign to U.S. bonds.   
  Finally, we also estimate models for a variety of U.S. interest rates—shorter term 
Treasury yields (2-year), high and lower quality corporate debt (Aaa and Baa), and long-
term fixed and short-term adjustable mortgage rates.  The impact of foreign inflows 
differs across these instruments, but it is always statistically significant and often 
economically large.  The impact on corporate bond rates and long-term (30-year) fixed 
mortgage rates is very similar to that on the 10-year Treasury yield.  Short-term rates are 
in general less affected by foreign flows, perhaps because as our models show they are 
more closely linked to the federal funds rate.  The differential effect on the two- and ten-
year Treasury yields implies that foreign flows have flattened the yield curve by about 75 
basis points. 
  Our paper is as follows.  In the next section, because there is considerable 
confusion about the different sources of capital flows data, we begin with a short 
description of the various capital flows data; show why we cannot use "off-the-shelf" 
flows data; and present capital flows series that are restated to eliminate known data 
problems.  In Section III we present our main regression results of 10-year Treasury 
yields, as well as various robustness checks.  Section IV addresses the interpretation of 
our results, in particular whether they appear to reflect a portfolio-switching effect or a 
supply effect associated with a global savings glut.  Section V presents evidence on other 
long- and short-term interest rates.  Section VI concludes.   6 
 
 
II. U.S. Data on International Capital Flows 
  There are many interrelated sources of data on U.S. capital flows.  In this section 
we discuss, in turn, weekly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), 
monthly data from the Treasury International Capital Reporting System (TIC), and 
monthly flows implied from infrequent benchmark surveys of positions (which we call 
benchmark-consistent flows).
6  Because of limitations of the monthly TIC data, discussed 
below, our preferred measure utilizes the benchmark-consistent flows—the restated flows 
that incorporate information from benchmark surveys. 
 
FRBNY Weekly Data on Foreign Official Holdings of Treasury Securities 
  The weekly FRBNY custodial data are the most timely data available for the 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities by foreign official institutions (central banks and 
finance ministries).  They are easily obtained
7 and of high quality; mistakes in FRBNY 
data are similar to a bank recording the wrong amount for an account balance, infrequent 
and likely quickly corrected.  Although the FRBNY is just one of many custodians, it is 
the U.S. custodian of choice for many of the world's central banks and finance ministries; 
at the end of June 2003, 88 percent of foreign official holdings of long-term Treasury 
securities were held in custody at the FRBNY.
8   
                                                 
6  Another important source, quarterly balance of payments (BOP) data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), will be mentioned only briefly. 
7  A memo item at the bottom of the first page of the H.4.1 release (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/) 
shows foreign official holdings at the FRBNY.  The Treasury and FRBNY data are not directly comparable 
for a number of reasons; see question C10 on Treasury's FAQ site (www.treas.gov/tic/faq1.html). 
8 From Table 10 of Treasury et al (2004) and the historical Major Foreign Holders table (available at 
www.treas.gov/tic/mfhhis01.txt), foreign official holdings at all U.S. custodians totaled $864 billion ($653 
billion in long-term Treasury securities and another $211 billion in short-term Treasury bills), of which 
$757 billion were held in custody at FRBNY.   7 
 
  The weekly FRBNY data are the best source of foreign official flows into U.S. 
securities.  However, foreign official purchases are often dwarfed by inflows from private 
foreigner investors.  For private flows, we must utilize data from the monthly TIC 
reports. 
 
Monthly TIC Data 
  The TIC system reports monthly data on the purchases and sales of all types of 
long-term securities (equities as well as corporate, agency, and Treasury bonds) by all 
foreigners (that is, foreign officials and private investors).
9  As such, the TIC data gives a 
much fuller picture of international flows into U.S. securities.  It is, however, less timely 
than the FRBNY data, being released six weeks after month’s end. 
  While the TIC system is more comprehensive than FRBNY’s custodial reports, 
for at least two reasons TIC data are not as accessible to most data users.  First, the data 
presentation is much more complicated; FRBNY publishes a single holdings number per 
week, whereas the TIC system publishes a myriad of time series each month.  Second, the 
TIC transactions data are by design less accurate than FRBNY’s custodial data.  Rather 
than directly accessing investors’ accounts to collect transactions data, the TIC system 
relies on market participants—primarily banks and broker dealers—to enter on reporting 
forms the amount of gross purchases and gross sales between U.S. and foreign residents.  
The aggregate nature of the TIC transactions data does not allow for the detailed editing 
and checking that is possible with security- or account-level data.  This, coupled with the 
                                                 
9  The TIC data also include data on short-term instruments and on U.S. investors trading in foreign 
securities.  We do not focus on these data in this paper.   8 
 
ever-increasing complexity of international financial systems, makes maintaining high 
quality data no small feat.     
  That said, we have no direct way of knowing whether the TIC capital flows data 
are accurate, in part because benchmark surveys of capital flows do not exist.  However, 
high quality security-level benchmark surveys of foreigners' holdings of U.S. securities—
surveys that recently have been conducted annually—can be used to gauge whether 
recorded capital flows data are reasonably accurate.  Specifically, one can form flows-
based holdings estimates and compare them with known holdings from the benchmark 
surveys.  The comparison is not perfect, because unknown valuation adjustments are 
incorporated into the marked-to-market positions data, but large discrepancies between 
holdings given by the comprehensive benchmark surveys and holdings implied from 
capital flows data would indicate a problem with the flows data. 
  Figure 3 shows flows-based holdings estimates (the solid lines) and benchmark 
amounts (the dots) for foreigners’ positions in Treasury, corporate, and agency bonds; 
complete details on the methodology for forming the flows-based holdings estimates are 
presented in the appendix.  For Treasury bonds, reported TIC flows appear to have been 
running a bit high in the late 1990s; the March 2000 estimate of $1,063 billion is almost 
$200 billion higher than the amount collected through the benchmark survey.  Since then, 
however, there is no evidence that TIC flows for Treasury bonds are inaccurate, as 
estimated holdings are right in line with benchmark amounts.  For corporate bonds, flows 
appear to have been slightly overstated at times, but the discrepancies are not egregious.    9 
 
Agency bonds are another story: The TIC system consistently overestimates foreigners’ 
purchases of agency bonds.
10   
  The discrepancy between flows implied from high-quality benchmark surveys and 
TIC reported flows makes it difficult for market participants to interpret and use the TIC 
transactions data.  We present a solution in the appendix.  Briefly, we can utilize the 
benchmark survey data to guide a restatement of monthly TIC flows.  The resulting 
series, which we call benchmark-consistent flows, will be quite similar to reported TIC 
flows when TIC flows are in line with the surveys.  But where there is a wide discrepancy 
between TIC flows and benchmark surveys--as with agency bonds--our benchmark-
consistent flows will differ substantially from reported TIC flows.   
Because the TIC data appear to overstate foreign flows into U.S. bonds (Figure 3), 
our adjustments will generally reduce reported flows.  This is especially true for agency 
bonds.  For example, in the 12-month period from July 2001 to June 2002, the TIC 
system reported that foreigners purchased on net $206 billion in agency bonds, whereas 
our monthly benchmark-consistent flows totaled only $68 billion for the same period.  In 
the empirical work that follows, we utilize benchmark-consistent flows.
11 
 
III. The Impact of Foreign Inflows on U.S. Long-Term Interest Rates 
Our basic approach follows Sack (2004): Estimate a reduced-form model of long-
term nominal interest rates that includes standard (but well thought-out) macroeconomic 
                                                 
10 This owes to an inability of the TIC system to cost-effectively collect data on the periodic principal 
payments on mortgage-backed securities—which should be recorded as capital outflows.  The TIC web site 
(www.treas.gov/tic/absprin.html) describes the issue and provides adjustments; however, those adjustments 
appear to be far too small to eliminate the discrepancy. 
11 The BEA also publishes international flows data in their quarterly BOP release.  For long-term securities, 
the quarterly BOP data is formed essentially by summing the monthly TIC data.  However, BEA adjusts 
reported TIC data if they feel it is warranted.  BEA's determines whether TIC flows data should be altered 
by consulting the infrequent benchmark positions data, so their adjustment is similar in spirit to ours.   10 
 
variables, show that the model performs reasonably well in normal times but less so 
recently, and then augment the model using various measures of foreign inflows into U.S. 
bonds.  We focus on the 10-year Treasury yield.  In Section V we also analyze other long 
rates (Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields and 30-year fixed mortgage rates) as well as 
two short rates (2-year Treasury yield and one-year adjustable mortgage rates). 
 
III.A.  Domestic Model of 10-year Treasury Yields 
The fact that in 2004 and the first half of 2005 long-term Treasury yields have 
remained so low is considered puzzling, largely because conventional models have 
predicted far higher rates.  In this subsection we lay out an example of a typical reduced-
form model.  The model is relatively standard, controlling for the influence of 
macroeconomic conditions and the monetary policy setting on Treasury yields.  Because 
the Treasury yield is a forward-looking asset price, we try to rely on variables that 
encompass forward-looking expectations. Specifically, we assume that the 10-year 
Treasury yield is a function of expected growth, expected inflation, a risk premium, and 
monetary and fiscal policy.  We briefly discuss each variable. 
(1)  Expected Growth and Expected Inflation 
Nominal long-term interest rates are, from the Fisher Equation, a function of real 
interest rates and expected inflation.  For expected inflation, we use both a long-term 
(10-year) measure, denoted  10
e
t π + , and a shorter-term (one-year) one that we express   11 
 
relative to long-term expectations ( 11 0
ee
tt π π + + − ).
12  Expected GDP growth over the 
subsequent year (denoted
e
t y 1 + ) helps capture factors that impact real interest rates. 
(2)  Risk Premium 
Investors must be compensated for bearing risk.  While U.S. Treasury bonds—the 
world’s risk-free rate—should be free of default risk, investors are nevertheless 
subject to interest rate risk.  As interest rates rise and fall, investors’ holdings of 
existing Treasury bonds become less (or more) valuable.  To proxy for an interest rate 
risk premium ( t rp ), we use the volatility of long-term interest rates, calculated as the 
rolling 36-month standard deviation of changes in long rates.   
(3)  Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Current monetary policy, captured by the target federal funds rate ( t ff ), has a direct 
impact on the short end of the yield curve and thus, based on the expectations theory 
of the term structure, also impacts long rates.  Fiscal policy, which should impact real 
rates, is a bit trickier to capture.  Because long rates are forward looking, best for our 
purposes would be to follow Laubach (2003) and utilize the long-dated budget 
projections of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).  However, these projections are available only infrequently.  Instead, 
we use a readily available measure, the structural budget deficit ( 1 − t deficit ) expressed 
as a percent of lagged GDP.  Our measure has one thing in common with the long-
                                                 
12  Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2005) show that surveys forecast inflation quite well.   12 
 




  The variables included are intended to provide an effective summary of economic 
and policy conditions that might influence Treasury yields through their implications for 
policy expectations and term premiums.  Many of the regressors are based on survey data 
rather than realized outcomes, since expectations of future developments should be the 
primary driver of Treasury yields.
14 
  Two econometric issues arise in estimating this regression; both are addressed in 
robustness checks presented in a later subsection.  The first issue is the potential 
endogeneity of the regressors.  We are assuming that the right-hand side variables do not 
respond contemporaneously to innovations to the interest rate.  This assumption seems 
reasonable (and is widely used) with regard to macroeconomic variables, which tend to 
be sluggish.  The assumption is somewhat less convincing, but is still maintained, with 
regard to survey expectations of macroeconomic variables and the current federal funds 
rate.  As a robustness check, presented later in this section, we alleviate this concern by 
modeling long-dated forward rates using only longer-term explanatory variables; our 
main results hold. 
  The second econometric issue concerns the stationarity of the dependent variable.  
Over the past twenty years, U.S. interest rates and inflation expectations have drifted 
lower, with no apparent tendency to revert to some stable average level.  That is, they 
                                                 
13  Moreover, as we will show, our estimates of the impact of budget deficits on interest rates are not 
dissimilar from those in Laubach (2003) or, by extension, Engen and Hubbard (2004). 
14 Short-term GDP growth and inflation expectations are from the Blue Chip survey; long-term inflation 
expectations are from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and are interpolated to 
monthly figures.    13 
 
appear to be nonstationary.  If they are indeed nonstationary and cointegrated, an 
unrestricted regression would pick up only the long-term relationship and not the shorter-
term dynamics that we are interested in.  Thus, to accurately estimate the impact of other 
regressors, we impose an assumption about the long-run relationship between interest 
rates and inflation expectations that is consistent with the work of Mehra (1998).  In 
particular, we assume that Treasury yields are non-stationary and are cointegrated with 
the federal funds rate and expected inflation by imposing that the coefficients on those 
two variables sum to one.
15  As a robustness check, we avoid this issue by modeling real 
interest rates, which are stationary.  Our main results hold (and those regressions provide 
additional analysis of the impact of flows on real rates). 
  Table 1 presents regression results—using only domestic explanatory variables—
for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield estimated using month-average data from January 
1984 to May 2005.  In this specification, the most significant drivers of long-term 
Treasury yields are expected long-run inflation, the risk premium, the size of the budget 
deficit, and the level of the federal funds rate.  Declining interest rate volatility lowers 
long rates, and, in line with the results in Laubach (2003), a one-percentage-point 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio increases long rates by 24 basis points.  A one-
percentage-point increase in long-term inflation expectations tends to increase nominal 
long rates by 57 basis points, and one percentage point of Fed tightening results in a 43 
basis point increase.  The usual relationship between Fed tightening and the long rate is 
                                                 
15 This restriction assumes that real interest rates are stationary.  It can be shown that imposing this 
restriction is identical to estimating the regression on the yield curve slope, with one of the regressors equal 
to the deviation of the federal funds rate from the long-run inflation rate.  One could argue that all of the 
variables from this alternative regression are stationary.  Moreover, if this restriction were not imposed, the 
impact of long-run inflation expectations would become implausibly large.   14 
 
shown clearly in Figure 4: Every time the Fed embarked on a tightening cycles long-term 
rates increased substantially.  Until recently, that is. 
The fit of the equations is generally good, with an adjusted R
2 of about 0.90.  
Figure 2 shows the fit, but also apparent is the puzzle: Given current macro and policy 
conditions, the domestic model predicts that the long rate should be roughly 100 basis 
points higher than it currently is.   
 
III.B. Foreign Inflows and Long-term Treasury Yields 
  Whether the recent large foreign inflows are behind the lower than expected long-
term Treasury yields is a open question.  Moreover, to our knowledge, little if any 
academic work has been done on this topic, perhaps because capital flows data are not 
easily interpretable.
16 
  In this section we present our regression model, which uses (alternately) three 
measures of capital flows that are intended to capture any systematic effects of inflows on 
Treasury yields.  The first measure is the headline-grabbing foreign official purchases of 
Treasury securities, which, as we have shown, is just one component of the recent large 
inflows.  The second and third measures more broadly capture the foreign flows into U.S. 
fixed-income markets.  The second, like the foreign official flows, focuses on the 
Treasury market: overall (that is, both foreign official and private foreign) purchases of 
Treasury bonds.
17  The third is the broadest measure of foreign flows into U.S. bonds: our 
benchmark-consistent series of overall foreign purchases of all types of U.S. bonds 
                                                 
16  Chinn and Frankel (2005) speculate that recent capital flows might be diluting traditional interest rate 
relationships. 
17 Benchmark-consistent flows for the component of overall bond inflows are not available prior to 1994, 
so for this second measure we utilize reported TIC data.  Figure 3 showed that for Treasuries reported data 
are rather accurate.   15 
 
(agency, corporate, and Treasury).   In each case, the foreign flow variable is constructed 
as twelve-month flows scaled by lagged GDP.
18 
  Regression results for the “global” model of 10-year yield that includes foreign 
flows are presented in Table 2.  As in the domestic model, the coefficients on expected 
inflation, the risk premium, the size of the budget deficit, and the level of the federal 
funds rate are highly significant.  In addition, expected growth becomes significant in 
these models.  Because the coefficients on ( 11 0
ee
tt π π + + − ) and  10
e
t π +  are of similar 
magnitudes, in these specifications short-term inflation expectations appear to be 
substantial drivers of nominal long rates (perhaps because they adjust more rapidly).  
Notably, all three foreign flow variables exhibit a significant negative impact on long 
rates.  Just as importantly, a comparison of Figure 5 with Figure 2 indicates that including 
a foreign flow variable eliminates the puzzle.  The global model tracks long-run rates 
well, and recent long-term rates are right in line with fundamentals. 
  Foreign flows are not only significant in a statistical sense, but their impact is also 
economically important.  Figure 6 shows the impact on the 10-year yield of total bond 
inflows and foreign official inflows.  Note that the graph is constructed to show how 
much lower U.S. rates are in comparison with the case of zero inflows.  Zero inflows 
over the course of an entire year are common enough for foreign official flows (see 
Figure 1), but are infrequent events for overall bond inflows.  That said, had the last 
twelve months seen zero foreign purchases of foreign bonds, our estimates suggest that 
U.S. long rates would be 150 basis points higher.  Foreign official accumulation, at its 
                                                 
18  Foreign official is actually the 12-month change in positions, which are measured by FRBNY at face 
value (i.e., they do not include valuation adjustments).  We do not use changes in positions for our other 
flow variables because in those cases positions are marked-to-market every month.  Doing so would 
incorporate valuation changes into the flow variable and, because these valuation changes owe to interest 
rate movements, would hardwire results.  Our flows variables do not suffer from this feature.   16 
 
summer 2004 peak, depressed U.S. long rates by 100 basis points.  For overall flows, a 
return to “average” inflows is perhaps a better benchmark; had the U.S. attracted only 
average overall bond inflows (2 percent  of GDP) long rates would be 105 basis points 
higher.  
  At first glance, our results appear to be large; in no way can 150 basis points be 
considered a small effect.  But recall that foreigners are major participants in U.S. bond 
markets.  They are most conspicuous in the Treasury market, where as of June 2004 they 
held 50 percent of outstanding tradable bonds, but they are also important players in all 
U.S. markets, holding 20 percent of the overall U.S. bond market (Treasury et al., 2005).  
The U.S. bond market is expanding by roughly $2 trillion per year.  One way to gauge the 
size of our estimates is to ask the following: If 20 percent of the market sat on the 
sidelines while $2 trillion in new bonds were issued, is a 150-basis-point increase 
implausibly large? 
  Another way to put our results in perspective is to compare them to other studies 
of interest rates.  For example, Laubach (2003) found that a one-percentage-point 
increase in the budget deficit would increase long rates by 25 basis points.  Over the 
course of 2002 and 2003 the budget deficit increased from near zero to 4 percent of GDP, 
which, according to the Laubach estimates, would imply a 100-basis-point impact on 
long rates.  If we witnessed a similarly dramatic movement in foreign flows, our results 
would imply a similar impact on long rates. 
  Finally, the finding of a relatively large foreign official effect on long-term 
Treasuries may seem puzzling, considering that foreign official institutions have 
traditionally preferred securities with short maturities.  However, indirect bidding activity   17 
 
from Treasury auctions suggests that these institutions have moved fairly aggressively 
into longer maturities.  This is corroborated by evidence from benchmark survey data, 
which indicates that as of mid-2004 more than one-third of foreign official holdings had a 
remaining maturity of more than four years (Treasury et al., 2005).  In addition, dollar for 
dollar, there may be greater scope for price effects on longer-term instruments; effects in 
the deeper markets for shorter maturities may be limited because there are large amounts 
of private assets available as substitutes and because prices of those securities are more 
strongly anchored by monetary policy instruments (as shown below). 
 
III. C. Robustness Checks 
  In this subsection we present a number of robustness checks.  To address any 
potential concerns about the non-stationarity of nominal interest rates over our sample 
and about the impact of short-run dynamics and business cycle fluctuations on our 
regressions, we analyze real rates and long-dated forward rates.  We estimate rolling 
regressions that depict the evolution of coefficient estimates over time to ascertain 
whether the significant effect of foreign flows on U.S. interest rates owes solely to the 
recent period of record inflows.  Finally, we bring corporate savings into the model to see 
if it, rather than foreign flows, is driving interest rate movements. 
 
Modeling Real Rates 
  We believe our main model is well specified, but recognize that in small samples 
issues of non-stationarity are difficult to convincingly address.  But real interest rates are 
clearly non-stationary, so we next examine real long-term interest rates (
e
t i 10 10 + −π ).  As   18 
 
Panel A of Table 3 shows, our main results hold.  Compared to the estimates in Table 2, 
the coefficient estimates on the foreign flows variables are smaller, but foreign flows 
significantly impact real long-term rates.   
 
Eliminating Effect of Short-run Business Cycle Variations 
  Any minor event that changes expectations should immediately impact the long 
rate; one cannot be certain that we accounted for every short-run variable that can impact 
Treasury yields.  To eliminate the impact of short-run business cycle fluctuations, we 
model an expected future real long rate, the real 5-5 forward rate (i.e., the five-year rate 
five years hence), using only long-term variables.
19  The results are presented in Panel B 
of Table 3.  Abstracting from business cycle considerations, real long-term forward rates 
are lower when risk premiums decrease and budget deficits are smaller.  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimates on the foreign flows variables are consistent with our main results.  
Even abstracting from the potentially confounding effects of business cycle fluctuations, 
foreign flows have a statistically and economically significant impact on U.S. interest 
rates.  In all, Table 3 shows that non-stationarity and business cycle fluctuations are 
unlikely to adversely affect our main regressions of Table 2. 
 
Do the Results Owe Solely to the Most Recent Period? 
  To determine whether our results owe solely to the most recent period of very 
large foreign inflows, we estimate rolling regressions of the 10-year yield.  Specifically, 
we re-estimate the regressions in Table 2 with the first re-estimation ending at January 
                                                 
19  Because data on 5-5 forward rates do not extend back to January 1984, we form these rates using the 
standard technique of Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983).   19 
 
1994 and each subsequent regression extending the sample by one month; the start date is 
always locked at January 1984.  The evolution of the coefficients on the foreign flows 
variables are presented in Figure 7.  The figure indicates that for Total Bond Inflows (Fig. 
7(a)), the estimate on the flow coefficient has been negative and significant for over a 
decade.  For the other types of flows, the current period has indeed played an important 
role.  Prior to the surge in inflows over the past few years, the coefficients on foreign 
official and flows into Treasuries were not significantly different from zero, although 
prior to the late 1990s these were negative and significant. 
 
Do Corporate Savings Solve the Puzzle? 
  JPMorgan (2005) is a well-publicized piece that claims to solve the puzzle of low 
long rates by including a measure of corporate savings.
20  The logic is that as the 
corporate sector moved from a net borrower in 2000 (with a financing gap of about 3 
percent of GDP) to a net saver by 2004 (a slightly negative financing gap), their reduced 
demand for capital should have put downward pressure on interest rates.   
  To test whether corporate savings, rather than foreign flows, helps explain the 
puzzle, we include a measure of the corporate financing gap (scaled by GDP).  Because 
the financing gap is available only quarterly, for this test we utilize a quarterly model.  
The results are presented in Table 4.  We find no evidence that the increased corporate 
savings has put downward pressure on U.S. interest rates; indeed, the sign on the 
                                                 
20 See the write up in the July 9, 2005 Economist article, “The corporate savings glut.”   20 
 
(insignificant) coefficient would suggest the opposite.  As in previous tables, in all three 
models foreign flows are economically and statistically important.
21   
 
IV. Interpretation of Our Main Results 
  The finding that the large foreign flows into U.S bonds has kept U.S. interest rates 
low leaves an interesting question unanswered.  Do foreign purchases represent a 
portfolio shift from foreign to U.S. bonds?  Or is the foreign accumulation part of a 
global savings glut in which bonds of all countries are being purchased at elevated 
amounts?   
We suspect that over time both effects are at work, perhaps with varying 
intensities and relative importance.  Unfortunately, a rigorous examination is hampered in 
part by lack of data, as sufficient time series of capital flows are available for surprisingly 
few countries.  For example, Warnock (2003) and Tesar and Werner (1995) were able to 
locate reasonable capital flows data for only a few countries.  We can, however, rely on 
price data to shed some light on this question.  In particular, if the decline in U.S. interest 
rates is being driven by a global trend, we should see evidence that U.S. rates are being 
dragged down by foreign rates.  That is, in our framework, a foreign spread variable, 
calculated as foreign rates less U.S. rates, should be positively related to U.S. long rates if 
a global savings glut is driving foreign and U.S. rates lower.  In contrast, if the large 
capital flows into U.S. bonds represent the shifting of global portfolios from foreign 
                                                 
21  We were surprised to find results that differed so greatly from those in JPMorgan (2005), so we 
investigated further.  We utilized, as they did, data on non-financial firms’ financing gap from the Federal 
Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts (Table F.102 line 59).  JPMorgan appends a measure for financial 
firms, although no such measure exists.  But their appended series is too similar to the reported one to 
explain the difference in results, which appears to owe to the sample; their sample extends back to 1959, 
and the few-year period ending 1984:Q1 experienced very high interest rates and a very high financing gap.   21 
 
bonds into U.S. bonds, the foreign spread variable should be negatively related to U.S. 
rates—when foreign rates rise relative to U.S rates, U.S. rates fall.   
Table 5 provides evidence suggestive of the portfolio switching effect.  The 
foreign spread variable is not positive, but rather is negative and significant.  When 
foreign rates rise relative to U.S rates, U.S. rates are falling, suggesting that the inflows 
are the result of portfolio-switching by global bond investors. 
Our intent is not to use the regressions presented in this subsection to rule out the 
global savings glut story, but to provide further evidence to guide the interpretation of our 
results.  In fact, it is likely that at times excess global savings pushes down U.S. rates.  
However, the long-term evidence is more supportive of a switching effect.   
 
V. The Impact of Foreign Inflows on Other U.S. Interest Rates 
  While the focus of our paper is on long-term Treasury yields, for further 
investigation we present results for other long-term interest rates as well as short-term 
rates.  Our regression specifications are as in the previous section, although we include 
one extra variable, t cycle , a real-time indicator of the state of the business cycle.
22  The 
business cycle variable plays two roles in what follows.  When employment growth is 
very weak, risk premiums on some of the riskier bonds we consider below might widen, 
so Cycle may capture a risk premium effect (separate from the interest rate risk 
premium).  Also, when we turn to shorter rates that adjust very quickly, there is a chance 
                                                 
22 Using real-time data from the Philadelphia Fed, we compute  t cycle  as the deviation of current real-time 
employment growth from its 36-month average.  There is a potential role for  t cycle  in our main 
regressions, as Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) show that long-term rates adjust to employment 
reports.  But including  t cycle  in our regressions for the 10-year Treasury yield would not alter our results, 
perhaps because Gurkaynak  et al. argue that surprises from employment reports impact long rates through 
changes in inflation expectations (for which we control).   22 
 
that our expectations data are sluggish.  If so, the real-time business cycle variable could 
pick up instantaneous adjustments in expectations. 
 
V. A. Results for Other Long-Term Rates 
  To see if our results also hold for a broader set of U.S. long-term interest rates, we 
re-estimate the regressions for corporate bond yields (for both Moody's Aaa and Baa) as 
well as a 30-year fixed mortgage rate.
23  The results are presented in Table 6.  While the 
coefficient estimates for some variables differ somewhat from those in our benchmark 
regressions, the drivers are similar.  In particular, these other long rates tend to be driven 
by inflation and growth expectations as well as risk premiums and policy variables.  
Moreover, foreign flows exhibit a substantial impact on these markets.   
 
V. B. Results for Short-Term Rates 
  Short-term interest rates are more closely tied to the federal funds rate, so we 
expect the impact of foreign flows to be more muted.  Table 7 confirms this for both the 
2-year Treasury yield and the 1-year adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).  For both, the 
coefficient on the foreign flows variable is about half those in previous tables, while the 
coefficient on the federal funds rate has increased substantially.  Note too that the 
coefficient on the business cycle indicator plays different roles in these regressions.  For 
ARMs, cyclical weakness is associated with higher rates, perhaps this owes to greater 
demand for the lower rates of ARMs when unemployment is temporarily high.  In 
                                                 
23 The corporate bond rate data is from the Federal Reserve Board H.15 statistical release 
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/).  Mortgage rate data are from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage 
Market Survey (www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms_archives.html).   23 
 
contrast, for short-term Treasury yields, the coefficient on the business cycle indicator is 
positive; cyclical weakness is associated with a decrease in short rates. 
  A comparison of the coefficients on the foreign flows variables in Table 7A and 
Table 2 suggests that foreign flows can explain at least some of the recent flattening of 
the yield curve.  In the last year and a half of our sample, the 10-year minus 2-year spread 
decreased by 185 basis points.  Our regressions suggest that the differential impacts of 
foreign flows on these rates are associated with 75 basis point of this flattening. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  This paper represents a first attempt at analyzing the impact of foreign flows on a 
large developed economy.  Past work has taught us much about the role of foreign 
investors in emerging market.  We can now add our results to this literature: Foreign 
flows have an economically large and statistically significant impact on long-term U.S. 
interest rates. 
Our work also appears to eliminate a current puzzle.  Long rates are indeed low, 
but not surprisingly so.  The results in this paper suggest that large foreign purchases of 
U.S. bonds have contributed importantly to the low levels of U.S. interest rates observed 
over the past two years.  We present a range of estimates of the impacts of foreign flows, 
depending on different assumptions of what the “normal” level of flows is.  The most 
extreme comparison is with the hypothetical case of zero foreign accumulation of U.S. 
bonds over the course of an entire year, which we show would leave long rates 150 basis 
points higher.      24 
 
We caution that although we present a multitude of robustness tests, it is possible 
that our results overstate the effects of foreign flows.  One might suspect that other 
factors not completely captured by the regressors were putting downward pressure on 
interest rates over this period.  Those other factors include FOMC statements suggesting 
that policy accommodation would be removed only slowly, worries about the risk of 
deflation, or a generally more benign outlook for inflation than suggested by the 
Philadelphia Fed’s surveys (which have long-run inflation expectations as essentially flat 
since the middle of 1998).  Still, the facts we present are suggestive of sizeable effects:  
Interest rates appear to be somewhat low, our regressions attribute a substantial portion of 
this behavior to foreign purchases, and the fit of our “global” model tracks actual 
Treasury yields quite well. 
  Foreign buying of U.S. bonds has clear benefits for the U.S. economy.  For 
example, by helping to keep interest rates relatively low, foreign buying has lowered 
borrowing costs and spurred economic activity.  Consumers benefit because, for example, 
the monthly mortgage payment on a 30-year fixed mortgage is $158 less at a 6 percent 
rate compared to the zero-inflow case of 7.2 percent rate.  Future work might provide a 
more detailed exploration of the implications of foreign flows for the real side of the U.S. 
economy. 
  The reader might ask whether a retreat of foreign investors from U.S. bond 
markets is likely imminent.  Not necessarily.  To be sure, as we showed in Figure 1, 
foreign official inflows are currently slowing, as they have many times in the past.  East 
Asian countries' exchange rate management has been one major source of the recent 
official demand (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004)), and whether these   25 
 
countries will continue to acquire large amounts of U.S. securities is in question.  The 
future demand from foreign officials is difficult to predict with any certainty—it is safe to 
say that their objective functions are sufficiently complex and include much more than 
just a desire for high risk-adjusted portfolio returns.  But with U.S. bonds comprising 
roughly half the global bond market, other international investors—be they speculators or 
institutions such as pension funds—are not likely to completely abandon the U.S. market.  
Indeed, zero net inflows into U.S. bonds over a sustained period has not occurred in at 
least 20 years.  Even during the 1990-1991 recession, when the U.S. current account was 
temporarily balanced (and thus net capital inflows were not required), annual foreign 
purchases of U.S. bonds still totaled about one percent of GDP (compared to the current 
record annual bond inflows of roughly 6 percent of GDP).  This is not to say that a retreat 
could not occur, just that a complete and sustained retreat is unlikely. 
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Appendix.  Creating Benchmark-Consistent Capital Flows Data 
To create benchmark-consistent capital flows data, we restate monthly TIC flows so that flows-
based holdings estimates are consistent with holdings reported in periodic benchmark surveys.   
 
Data Requirements 
Bilateral capital flows.  Foreigners’ transactions in U.S. securities are reported monthly to the 
TIC System, mainly by brokers and dealers.  For U.S. long-term debt securities (with original 
maturity greater than one year), these mandatory reports contain information on gross purchases 
and gross sales (at market value) and the country of the foreign counterparty to the transaction.  
The TIC data are available at www.treas.gov/tic. 
 
Benchmark liabilities surveys.  Data on foreign holdings of U.S. securities, available at 
www.treas.gov/fpis, are collected in detailed but infrequent security-level benchmark liabilities 
surveys conducted in December of 1978, 1984, 1989, and 1994; March 2000; and June of 2002, 
2003, and 2004.
24  Reporting to the surveys is mandatory, with penalties for noncompliance, and 
the data received are subjected to extensive analysis and editing.  For liabilities surveys (of 
foreign holdings of U.S. securities), the reporters consist primarily of large custodians (banks and 
broker-dealers).  U.S. firms that issue securities are also included in the survey, but they typically 
have little information about the actual owners of their securities because U.S. securities are 
typically registered on their books in “street name”—that is, in the name of the custodian, not of 
the ultimate investor. 
 
Valuation adjustments.  We utilize three Lehman Brothers indexes: Lehman Brothers US 
Treasury Index, Lehman Brothers US Agency Index, and Lehman Brothers US Corporate 
Investment Grade Index.  
 
Transaction costs.  The TIC data are reported gross at cost including commissions and taxes, so 
to compute the value of securities bought or sold, an adjustment for transaction costs must be 
made.  For round-trip transaction costs in U.S. debt securities, we rely on rough estimates of bid-
ask spreads provided by market participants of 5 basis points on US Treasury debt, 10 basis 
points on US agency debt, and 25 basis points on US corporate debt.  
 
Methodology 
To form benchmark-consistent capital flows data, we first form monthly benchmark-consistent 
holdings.  The restated flows consistent with those holdings estimates are our benchmark-
consistent flows.  We form separate estimates for agency, corporate, and Treasury bonds.  All that 
follows is for a particular type i of long-term debt security (i=agency, corporate, Treasury); we 
omit the subscript i in the equations below. 
 
We begin by forming naive baseline estimates.  End-of-month holdings are formed by adjusting 
the previous month’s holdings for estimated price changes and adding the current month’s 
(transaction cost-adjusted) net purchases.  Specifically, we use the following formula to form 
naive estimates of foreign investors’ holdings of U.S. debt securities at the end of period t: 
 
                                                 
 
24 Details of the 2004 liabilities survey, including findings and methodology, are 
discussed in Treasury Department et al. (2005).  Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001) is a primer on 
the surveys. The recent annual surveys are “mini” surveys that serve to supplement the 
quinquennial full benchmarks.     30 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 tc gs tc gp r nh nh t t t t t + − − + + = −       (A1) 
 
where 
nht   naive estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. bonds at the end of month t  
rt  returns  from  period  t-1 to t, computed from appropriate price indices 
gpt  foreigners’ gross purchases of U.S. bonds during month t 
gst  foreigners’ gross sales of U.S. bonds during month t 
tc  a constant adjustment factor for transaction costs 
 
We then combine the naive baseline estimates with holdings from the infrequent benchmark 
surveys (conducted at time T) to form benchmark-consistent holdings estimates.  For example, to 
form estimates for the January 1995 - March 2000 inter-survey period, we start from the 
December 1994 benchmark survey amount and apply equation (A1) to form estimates to March 
2000.  Doing so results in a naive estimate of holdings as of March 2000 (nh T) that differs from 
holdings as given by the benchmark survey (bhT) by an amount, gapT: 
 
T T T nh bh gap − =          (A2) 
 
One possible cause for the gap is errors in the capital flows data.  Assuming that such errors are 
larger in months with greater trading activity, we add to each inter-survey month an amount that 
is a function of the gap and the proportion of inter-survey trading activity that occurred in that 















* *       (A3) 
 
where periods 1 and T span the entire inter-survey period.  For each inter-survey period, 
everything on the right side of (A3) is given except adjfactor, which we choose to minimize the 
distance at time T between benchmark holdings and our adjusted holdings estimates: 
 
T T h bh − min           (A4) 
 
where our adjusted holdings estimates, ht, evolve according to 
 
t t t t t t adj tc gs tc gp r h h + + − − + + = − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1     (A5) 
 
and, for all t, we impose a non-negativity constraint on our holdings estimates: 
 
0 ≥ t h            (A6) 
 
Because the adjustment for any period t must be part of the revaluation that produces period t+1 
holdings (and so on), this is not a simple linear problem and, accordingly, we employ a grid-
search method to solve for the adjustment factor.  Once the adjustment factor is determined and 
applied to (A3), our benchmark-consistent flows, or net purchases (npt), are given by 
 
t t t t adj tc gs tc gp np + + − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 (        (A7)   31 
 
 
Note three features of our adjustment factor.  First, adjfactor can differ across inter-survey 
periods.  Second, adjfactor is constant within an inter-survey period, but the adjustment itself, 
adjt, is time-varying.  Third, for the period after the last survey we cannot form adjustment factors 
and so apply adjfactor from the previous inter-survey period.  To the extent that the relationship 
between TIC-reported flows and benchmark surveys will change in the future, our estimates that 
post-date the most recent survey should be considered preliminary. 
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Table 1:  Domestic Model of Ten-Year Treasury Yield 
OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , using domestic variables only.  The 














t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year; and  1 − t deficit is 
the structural budget deficit.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote 
significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  The sample is 































t π +   0.57 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.22 (0.19) 
1
e
t y +   0.07 (0.07) 
t rp   5.37 (0.64) 
t ff   0.43 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.24 (0.03) 
  
2 R   0.89   33 
 
 
Table 2:  Global Model of Ten-Yield Treasury Yield 
OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , using domestic variables and a global foreign 















t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the 
structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP); and t foreign are 12-month foreign flows in U.S. bonds 
(scaled by lagged GDP) .  There are three alternative definitions of  t foreign : Total Bonds are the 
benchmark-consistent flows from all foreign investors into all U.S. bonds (Treasury, agency, and 
corporates); Treasury Bonds are reported foreign flows into Treasury bonds; and Foreign Official are 
foreign governments’ purchases of Treasury securities.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust 
to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in 
bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not 




10-year yield  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.70 (0.03)  0.60 (0.03)  0.68 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.90 (0.19)  0.50 (0.18)  0.80 (0.20) 
1
e
t y +   0.35 (0.07)  0.21 (0.07)  0.17
a (0.07) 
t rp   5.94 (0.63)  4.50 (0.65)  5.76 (0.64) 
t ff   0.30 (0.03)  0.40 (0.03)  0.32 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.13 (0.03)  0.25 (0.03)  0.28 (0.03) 
t foreign   -0.23 (0.02)  -0.23 (0.03)  -0.43 (0.06) 
      
2 R   0.91 0.90  0.89 
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Table 3:  Global Model of Real Long Rates 
Panel A:  OLS regressions explaining the real 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t r , using domestic variables and a 
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where  10 , t r  is calculated as 
e
t t i 10 10 , + −π ; 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation 
expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate;  t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP 
growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP); 
and t foreign are 12-month foreign flows in U.S. bonds (scaled by lagged GDP) .  There are three 
alternative definitions of  t foreign : Total Bonds are the benchmark-consistent flows from all foreign 
investors into all U.S. bonds (Treasury, agency, and corporates); Treasury Bonds are reported foreign flows 
into Treasury bonds; and Foreign Official are foreign governments’ purchases of Treasury securities. 
 
Panel B: OLS regressions explaining future expected long rates—specifically, the real 5-5 forward 
rate, 5 5 , − t r —using only longer-term domestic variables and a global foreign flows variable.  The 
specification is as follows: 
 
t t t t t foreign d deficit c rp b a r ε + + + + = − − ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 5 5 ,  
 
For both panels, standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance 
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  The sample is monthly from 






Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.40
b (0.21)  0.07 (0.19)  0.12 (0.22) 
1
e
t y +   0.35 (0.07)  0.29 (0.07)  0.26 (0.07) 
t rp   4.01 (0.71)  2.79 (0.69)  3.25 (0.71) 
t ff   0.35 (0.03)  0.42 (0.03)  0.41 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.06
a(0.02)  0.11 (0.02)  0.13 (0.03) 
t foreign   -0.14 (0.02)  -0.11 (0.03)  -0.18 (0.07) 
      
2 R   0.92 0.91  0.91 
Panel B:  
Real 5-5  
Forward Rate 
Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds  Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official 
t rp   11.02 (0.57)  10.55 (0.60)  11.01 (0.53) 
1 − t deficit    0.11 (0.02)   0.23 (0.02)   0.28 (0.03) 
t foreign   -0.27 (0.02)  -0.35 (0.03)  -0.61 (0.06) 
      
2 R   0.88 0.85  0.84 
   36 
 
Table 4:  Global Model Including Corporate Savings 
OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , using domestic variables (including corporate 
savings) and a global foreign flows variable.  The specification is as follows: 
 













t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the 
structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP);  t foreign are 12-month foreign flows in U.S. bonds 
(scaled by lagged GDP); and  t fingap  is the financing gap (from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (Table F. 
102, line 59)), scaled by GDP.  There are three alternative definitions of  t foreign : Total Bonds are the 
benchmark-consistent flows from all foreign investors into all U.S. bonds (Treasury, agency, and 
corporates); Treasury Bonds are reported foreign flows into Treasury bonds; and Foreign Official are 
foreign governments’ purchases of Treasury securities.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust 
to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in 
bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not 
reported.  Unlike other regressions in this paper, the sample here is quarterly (1984:Q1 – 2005:Q1).  Yields 
are measured in percentage points. 
 
DepVar: 
10-year yield  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.69 (0.07)  0.54 (0.07)  0.65 (0.07) 
11 0
ee




t y +   0.38 (0.14)  0.22
b(0.13) 0.25
b(0.13) 
t rp   6.16 (1.02)  4.28 (1.06)  5.78 (1.03) 
t ff   0.31 (0.07)  0.46 (0.07)  0.35 (0.07) 
1 − t deficit   0.13 (0.05)  0.21 (0.04)  0.25 (0.04) 




-0.03 (0.09)   -0.15 (0.09)   -0.15 (0.09) 
      
2 R   0.91 0.90  0.88 
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Table 5:  Global Model Including Foreign Spread 
OLS regressions explaining the 10-year Treasury yield,  10 , t i , using domestic variables, a global foreign 
flows variable, and a foreign spread variable.  The specification is as follows: 
 













t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-ahead inflation expectations;  t ff is the federal funds rate; 
t rp is an interest rate risk premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the 
structural budget deficit (scaled by lagged GDP);  t foreign are 12-month foreign flows in U.S. bonds 
(scaled by lagged GDP); and  t spread  is the spread of foreign interest rates over U.S. rates, where foreign 
rates are a simple average of long rates in Germany, Japan, and the UK.  There are three alternative 
definitions of  t foreign : Total Bonds are the benchmark-consistent flows from all foreign investors into 
all U.S. bonds (Treasury, agency, and corporates); Treasury Bonds are reported foreign flows into Treasury 
bonds; and Foreign Official are foreign governments’ purchases of Treasury securities.  Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  Highly significant coefficients 
(at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Constants included but not reported.  Yields are measured in percentage points. 
 
DepVar: 
10-year yield  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.80 (0.03)  0.75 (0.03)  0.73 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   1.14 (0.19)  1.09 (0.18)  1.11 (0.18) 
1
e
t y +   0.15 (0.06)  -0.01 (0.06)  0.00 (0.05) 
t rp   3.50 (0.50)  1.78 (0.51)  3.18 (0.50) 
t ff   0.20 (0.03)  0.25 (0.03)  0.27 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   0.13 (0.02)  0.25 (0.02)  0.25 (0.02) 




-0.38 (0.04)  -0.43 (0.04)  -0.29 (0.04) 
      
2 R   0.93 0.92  0.91   38 
 
Table 6:  Global Models of Other Long-Term Interest Rates 
OLS regressions explaining the Aaa corporate bond rate (Panel A), Baa corporate bond rate (Panel B), and 
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where  t i  is the nominal interest rate (Aaa, Baa, or 30-year fixed); 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-year-
ahead inflation expectations;  t cycle  is a business cycle indicator computed as the real-time change in 
employment relative to its 36-month average;  t ff is the federal funds rate;  t rp is an interest rate risk 
premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the structural budget deficit 
(scaled by lagged GDP); and t foreign are 12-month foreign flows in U.S. bonds (scaled by lagged GDP) .  
There are three alternative definitions of  t foreign : Total Bonds are the benchmark-consistent flows from 
all foreign investors into all U.S. bonds (Treasury, agency, and corporates); Treasury Bonds are reported 
foreign flows into Treasury bonds; and Foreign Official are foreign governments’ purchases of Treasury 
securities.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  
Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  The sample is monthly from January 
1984 to May 2005.  Yields are measured in percentage points. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Aaa Corporate  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.80 (0.03)  0.75 (0.02)  0.82 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.42 (0.14)   0.24
b (0.14)  0.60 (0.16) 
1
e
t y +   0.30 (0.06)  0.14
a (0.06)  0.18 (0.06) 
t cycle   -0.05
 (0.16)  0.01 (0.16)  -0.24 (0.16) 
t rp   5.94 (0.56)  5.01 (0.53)  5.50 (0.53) 
t ff   0.20 (0.03)  0.25 (0.02)  0.18 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit   -0.05
a(0.02)   0.06 (0.02)   0.09 (0.02) 
t foreign   -0.24 (0.02)  -0.30 (0.03)  -0.50 (0.05) 
      
2 R   0.93 0.92  0.91   39 
 
 
Panel B:  
Baa Corporate  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.87 (0.03)  0.82 (0.03)  0.90 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.33
a(0.15)   0.15 (0.15)  0.52 (0.17) 
1
e
t y +   0.25 (0.07)  0.09 (0.06)   0.11
b (0.06) 
t cycle   -0.47 (0.18)  -0.36
a (0.18)  -0.62 (0.18) 
t rp   9.06 (0.63)  7.98 (0.57)  8.25 (0.57) 
t ff   0.13 (0.03)  0.18 (0.03)  0.10 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit    -0.07
a(0.03)   0.06 (0.02)   0.10 (0.02) 
t foreign   -0.27 (0.02)  -0.37 (0.03)  -0.63 (0.05) 
      
2 R   0.93 0.93  0.92 
Panel C:  
30-year Fixed 
Mortgage Rate 
Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.64 (0.03)  0.60 (0.03)  0.66 (0.03) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −   0.32




t y +   0.31 (0.06)  0.16 (0.06)  0.16 (0.06) 
t cycle   -0.21 (0.17)  -0.10 (0.17)  -0.42
b (0.17) 
t rp   6.13 (0.63)  5.31 (0.59)  5.87 (0.59) 
t ff   0.36 (0.03)  0.40 (0.03)  0.34 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit    0.08 (0.03)   0.18 (0.02)   0.20 (0.02) 
t foreign   -0.20 (0.02)  -0.29 (0.03)  -0.46 (0.05) 
      
2 R   0.94 0.94  0.93   40 
 
Table 7:  Regression Results for Short-Term Rates 
OLS regressions explaining the 2-year Treasury yield (Panel A) and the 1-year ARM (Panel B).  The 
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where  t i  is the nominal interest rate (2-year Treasury or 1-year ARM); 
e
t 10 + π  and 
e
t 1 + π are 10-year- and 1-
year-ahead inflation expectations;  t cycle  is a business cycle indicator computed as the real-time change in 
employment relative to its 36-month average;  t ff is the federal funds rate;  t rp is an interest rate risk 
premium; 
e
t y 1 +  is expected real GDP growth over the next year;  1 − t deficit is the structural budget deficit 
(scaled by lagged GDP); and t foreign are 12-month foreign flows in U.S. bonds (scaled by lagged GDP) .  
There are three alternative definitions of  t foreign : Total Bonds are the benchmark-consistent flows from 
all foreign investors into all U.S. bonds (Treasury, agency, and corporates); Treasury Bonds are reported 
foreign flows into Treasury bonds; and Foreign Official are foreign governments’ purchases of Treasury 
securities.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation).  
Highly significant coefficients (at the 1% level) are shown in bold; 
a and 
b denote significance at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  Constants included but not reported.  The sample is monthly from January 
1984 to May 2005.  Yields are measured in percentage points. 
 
Panel A:  
2-year Treasury  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.22 (0.03)  0.17 (0.03)  0.19 (0.03) 
11 0
ee





t y +   0.20 (0.06)  0.15
a (0.06)  0.12
a (0.06) 
t cycle   0.86
 (0.19)  0.75 (0.19)  0.51 (0.17) 
t rp   1.91 (0.60)  1.48
a (0.60)  1.98 (0.61) 
t ff   0.78 (0.03)  0.83 (0.03)  0.81 (0.03) 
1 − t deficit    0.07
a (0.03)   0.09 (0.03)   0.14 (0.03) 
t foreign   -0.11 (0.02)  -0.09 (0.03)  -0.09
b (0.06) 
      
2 R   0.95 0.95  0.94   41 
 
 
Panel B:  
1-year ARM  Foreign Flow Variable: 
  Total Bonds   Treasury 
Bonds  Foreign Official
10
e
t π +   0.45 (0.03)  0.45 (0.03)  0.50 (0.02) 
11 0
ee
tt π π ++ −    -0.16 (0.13)   -0.23
b (0.12)  -0.03 (0.14) 
1
e
t y +   0.42 (0.06)  0.35 (0.05)  0.34 (0.05) 
t cycle   -0.97 (0.17)  -0.78 (0.16)  -0.92
 (0.16) 
t rp   5.51 (0.61)  5.13 (0.56)  5.38 (0.53) 
t ff   0.55 (0.03)  0.55 (0.02)  0.50 (0.02) 
1 − t deficit   -0.09 (0.02)  -0.06 (0.02)  -0.03
b (0.02) 
t foreign   -0.08 (0.02)  -0.19 (0.02)  -0.36 (0.05) 
      
2 R   0.96 0.96  0.96 
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Figure 1.  Foreign Inflows into U.S. Bonds 
Both variables are 12-month flows scaled by lagged GDP.  Data on foreign official purchases of Treasuries 
are from FRBNY’s H.4.1 release.  Data of total foreign purchases of U.S. bonds are our benchmark-
consistent flows, which are described in detail in the appendix. 
Foreign Official Purchases of US Treasuries and Total Foreign Purchases of US Bonds




























Figure 2.  Long-Term Treasury Yield: Actual vs. Fitted using domestic variables 
Fitted uses the domestic model of Table 1. 
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Figure 3.  TIC-based Estimates of Foreign Positions in U.S. Bonds 
TIC-based estimates start from benchmark survey amounts, shown by the large circles, and are formed by 
applying equation (A1); see the appendix for details.  Major discrepancies in TIC-based estimates and the 
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Figure 4.  Long-Term Treasury Yield and the Federal Funds Rate 
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Figure 5.  Long-Term Treasury Yield: Actual vs. Fitted including capital flows 
Fitted uses the global model of Table 2. 














Figure 6:  Impact of Foreign Flows into US Bonds on 10-year Treasury Yields 
Impact is calculated from the coefficient estimates in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2. 
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Figure 7.  Coefficient Estimate on Foreign Flow Variables 
Coefficient estimate is from rolling regressions of the models in Table 2. 
(a) Total Bonds 
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